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The authors examined whether status differences moderate the effects of common fate
on subgroup relations. University students (N  103) were led to believe that their
subgroup was performing well (high status) or poorly (low status) relative to another
subgroup. They were then told that the combined performances of the subgroups would
have shared implications for their subgroup’s welfare (common fate) or that there
would be a direct link between their subgroup’s performance and its welfare (no
common fate). High-status (but not low-status) group members responded to the
common fate situation by (a) decategorizing and (b) showing benevolence to the
out-group. Results are discussed with respect to their implications for managing
subgroup relations.
The idea of the “group” as a singular, homo-
geneous, undifferentiated entity is largely a
myth. Most large-scale categories—nations, for
example, or work organizations—are superim-
posed on meaningful subgroup differences,
which in turn can be cross-cut by other identi-
ties defined by intragroup role assignments or
by category memberships based on profession,
socioeconomic status, gender, religion, ethnic-
ity, and so forth. It is the diversity of identities
within groups that can provide excitement,
stimulation, and innovation (e.g., Van Knippen-
berg & Haslam, 2003), but they can also repre-
sent a threat to the cohesiveness of the super-
ordinate group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).
How to manage subgroup differences has be-
come a concern recently of many social and
organizational psychologists (Dovidio, Gaert-
ner, & Validzic, 1998; Eggins, Haslam, &
Reynolds, 2002; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a;
Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; Haslam, 2001; Van
Leeuwen, Van Knippenberg, & Ellemers,
2003).
One frequently nominated strategy for help-
ing subgroups get along is to introduce a sense
of common fate—in other words, to invoke the
notion that the subgroups’ futures or rewards for
performance are shared (Gaertner et al., 1999;
Sherif, 1966). The power of shared rewards to
promote intergroup cooperation is grounded in
the fact that it does not rely on higher order
principles of tolerance or altruism; rather, it
trades on people’s self-interest. The rewards
people accrue on the basis of their subgroup
performance are dependent on the performance
of other subgroups, and so acts of sharing and
cooperation service one’s own group’s needs
and goals. In contrast, acts of inter-subgroup
hostility and competition are damaging to the
group’s interests. In short, under conditions of
common fate, subgroups have to pull together if
they want to be successful.
Although the positive consequences of com-
mon fate are well documented, less attention
has been paid to the potentially negative conse-
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quences of common fate. When the outcomes
for both groups are intimately intertwined, the
potential exists for dissatisfaction, particularly
if one subgroup is contributing more to the
shared outcomes than another. This is because
the higher status subgroup (i.e., the subgroup
that is contributing most to the superordinate
group in terms of material outcomes or prestige)
might feel as though it is being “dragged down”
by the lower status subgroup. In this article we
describe the results of a study in which we
experimentally examined how status differ-
ences affect the experience of common fate for
subgroup members. First, however, we review
theory and literature regarding common fate,
status, and social identity.
Common Fate
Common fate has been defined as represent-
ing “a coincidence of outcomes among two or
more persons that arises because they have been
subjected to the same external forces or decision
rules” (Brewer, 2000, p. 118). One way of con-
ceptualizing (and operationalizing) this con-
struct is in terms of group members sharing the
outcomes of their group’s performance. When
rewards are structured such that all group mem-
bers share equally the fruits of labor, this can be
seen as a common fate situation. A number of
studies have shown that groups governed by
such reward structures tend to work together
more cooperatively and productively than when
individuals within groups are rewarded differ-
entially (see, e.g., Deutsch, 1949; Rosenbaum et
al., 1980; Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, &
Butemeyer, 1998). Indeed, Lewin (1948) and
Campbell (1958) saw common fate (or “inter-
dependence of fate”) to be a critical precondi-
tion for groups to become real, in a psycholog-
ical sense.
If common fate can help knit individuals to-
gether as groups, then it seems reasonable to
suggest that common fate between groups
should help build a sense of common in-group
identity at the superordinate level. For example,
in the classic summer camp studies, Sherif
(1966) found that the tension that had been
generated between two groups of boys at camp
could be gradually decreased by introducing
tasks that could be achieved only by combining
their efforts (positive interdependence). In a
similar vein, Gaertner et al. (1999) found that
the introduction of common fate (through the
introduction of mutual or independent rewards
on a task) was associated with lower bias in
nonverbal reactions in response to in-group and
out-group members’ ideas. Finally, Castano
(2002) manipulated entitativity by stressing the
fact that European countries share a common
fate within the European Union. As expected,
he found an increase in the level of identifica-
tion with the European Union among the par-
ticipants holding moderate and positive atti-
tudes. Thus, the bulk of research suggests that
common fate has generally positive conse-
quences in terms of promoting intergroup
harmony.
Status and Social Identity
It should be noted that the research conducted
so far has focused on the effects of common fate
with groups of equal status or in situations
where status differences are not made salient.
However, in real life, a situation of common
fate between groups of equal status is more the
exception than the rule. Little is known about
the precise group processes that take place when
common fate is invoked among groups of dif-
ferent status.
One theory that has much to say about inter-
group status differences is social identity theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Hogg, 2002, and
Turner, 1999, for recent reviews). Proponents of
social identity theory argue that one of the fun-
damental motives underlying group behavior is
the drive to see the in-group as positively dis-
tinct from other groups. Because a part of our
self-concept is determined by our group mem-
berships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the relative
status of the groups we belong to can have a
significant impact on our self-regard. Consistent
with the social identity perspective, higher
group status is related to higher self-esteem
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), stronger identification
with the in-group (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knip-
penberg, & Wilke, 1992; Ellemers, Van Knip-
penberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers,
Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990), and greater
in-group favoritism (e.g., Brown & Wade,
1987; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987).
It is often assumed that members of high-
status groups tend to show more in-group bias
than do members of low-status groups; how-
ever, this tendency is certainly not universal.
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First, this effect emerges predominantly in stud-
ies that use minimal or ad hoc groups (Mullen,
Brown, & Smith, 1992). When real-world
groups are used, there is no systematic effect of
status on intergroup bias. This might be because
the effect of status on bias is moderated by
legitimacy. If people feel as though their low-
status position is illegitimate (e.g., the result of
discrimination or disadvantage), then low-status
group members typically contest the status hi-
erarchy, resulting in enhanced intergroup bias.
If, however, people feel their low-status posi-
tion is legitimate, then they might concede their
inferiority on status-defining characteristics and
seek positive differentiation only on peripheral
dimensions such as warmth and friendliness
(Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998;
Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993;
Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Alterna-
tively, legitimately low-status group members
might seek individualistic strategies to escape
their negative social identity. They might do
this by seeking membership of the higher status
group or, if the intergroup boundaries are im-
permeable, by withdrawing psychologically
from the group and focusing on their individual
identities.
Common Fate as a Source of Threat for
High-Status Groups
The benefit of high-status group membership
is that it offers rewards in terms of material
outcomes and/or prestige. However, in some
common fate situations, these rewards are di-
luted by the performance of the lower status
subgroup. Low-status subgroup members, on
the other hand, are unduly rewarded courtesy of
their association with the more successful sub-
group. For low-status subgroups, then, common
fate would seem to be a desirable state, because
their access to rewards is enhanced. Their reac-
tion to this would most likely be feelings of
positivity toward the other subgroup and to the
superordinate group as a whole.
For members of high-status subgroups, how-
ever, common fate would seem to be an unde-
sirable state because their access to rewards is
diminished.1 There are three possible ways in
which high-status group members might react
to such a situation. One possibility is that, in
line with research on identity threat (e.g.,
Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999),
members of high-status groups might show in-
creased derogation toward the lower status out-
group (out-group derogation). Although this
strategy does not help improve the subgroup’s
objective position, it might be a natural re-
sponse to a feeling of frustration and resentment
at being dragged down by the lower status
group.
A second possibility is that members of the
high-status subgroup will extend support and
help toward the lower status subgroup (out-
group benevolence). This is a more effective
strategy in terms of improving the overall posi-
tion of the group and maximizing the sub-
group’s interests. By lending a benevolent hand
to the weaker out-group, people can engage in a
long-term strategy to maximize the shared out-
comes for all.
A third possibility is that members of high-
status subgroups might retreat from their group
identities altogether (decategorization). Typi-
cally, decategorization is seen as a strategy used
by members of low-status groups to escape their
unsatisfactory group identity (see Ellemers et
al., 1988, 1990). In this case, however, decat-
egorization might be an adaptive response for
members of high-status groups who, upon real-
izing that there is no direct relationship between
the group’s performance and the ensuing re-
wards, might decide that group identification is
an unstable and unrewarding platform on which
to build their self-concept. Their response to
this might be to revoke their group member-
ships as an important aspect of self-definition
and to rely instead on their personal identities.
Although decategorization does not in itself
lead to tangible rewards for group members, it
1 Of course, our argument that status will moderate the
effects of common fate makes sense only when common
fate is operationalized in terms of shared outcomes that flow
on from performance (as it was, for example, by Deutsch,
1949; Gaertner et al., 1999; Rosenbaum et al., 1980). How-
ever, it is possible that groups can experience a sense of
common fate that is not framed in terms of performance. For
example, Kramer and Brewer (1984) manipulated the com-
mon fate of participants by having subgroup members take
part either in a single lottery that affected the superordinate
group or in separate lotteries that affected only their sub-
group. The study showed that common fate led to an aware-
ness of a common in-group identity, which in turn helped
group members behave more cooperatively in a common
dilemma task. In situations such as this, in which the shared
outcomes are determined by chance events, the relative
performances of the subgroups would be irrelevant.
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may reflect a psychological need to revert to a
world in which individual rewards flow on from
individual efforts, rather than being filtered
through the performance of one’s group. By
decategorizing and focusing on their individual
identity, people might be rejecting a level of
self-definition at which there is a weak relation-
ship between effort and rewards (the group
level) and embracing a level of self-definition at
which efforts and rewards feel more clearly
linked (the individual level).
To date, there is no specific research that
allows us to make predictions with regard to
which strategy is likely to be preferred in a
particular context. We should note, however,
that we do not see the strategies to be mutually
exclusive; rather, they meet different needs.
Psychologically, decategorization can be seen
as an escape strategy, which is attractive pre-
cisely because it offers an immediate cognitive
response to an unsatisfactory situation. Thus,
this strategy might satisfy psychological needs
for well-being. Out-group benevolence, on the
other hand, represents a more long-term, group-
based strategy designed to change the structural
relations between groups, thus satisfying a need
for tangible rewards. It is conceivable, then, that
people could engage in both strategies simulta-
neously, in the sense that they might endorse
out-group benevolence as a long-term strategy
for positive change, while at the same time
buffering themselves psychologically from their
existing situation by decategorizing. Similarly,
it is conceivable that members of high-status
subgroups might feel resentment and negativity
toward the lower status out-group (out-group
derogation) but, for utilitarian reasons, behave
in a way that suggests benevolence.
The Current Research
In the current experiment, we used maths-
science and social-science students as sub-
groups nested within the superordinate identity
of University of Queensland (UQ). Maths-sci-
ence and social-science participants were led to
believe that their faculty area was performing
either well (high-status condition) or poorly
(low-status condition) relative to the other fac-
ulty area. In the no common fate condition,
participants were led to believe that the welfare
of each subgroup depended on the performance
of their subgroup independently of the other
group’s performance. In the common fate con-
dition, participants were led to believe that the
welfare of each group depended on the com-
bined performance of both subgroups. Partici-
pants then completed a questionnaire in which
they recorded their attitudes and intended be-
haviors toward each of the subgroups. Measures
included indices of the extent to which they felt
favorably toward each of the groups (intergroup
evaluations), salience and identification at the
subgroup and superordinate group levels, de-
grees of individualization, and degrees of inter-
group competition (included here to test the
out-group benevolence hypothesis).
In the no common fate condition, predictions
were based on previous research on the effects
of status differences on social identity and in-
tergroup relations. Because the status differen-
tials were presented to the participants as being
legitimate and immutable, we expected that
high-status group members would show stron-
ger in-group bias on intergroup evaluations
(Hypothesis 1a) and stronger subgroup identifi-
cation (Hypothesis 1b) than would low-status
group members.
Previous work on common fate suggests that
the induction of common fate between two
groups should raise the salience of the superor-
dinate group and foster a sense of superordinate
identification, thus fostering more positive eval-
uations of the out-group. On the basis of the
rationale presented above, however, we might
expect that common fate would have such pos-
itive effects only for low-status subgroup mem-
bers. Specifically, we expected that low-status
group members would express more positive
evaluations of the out-group (Hypothesis 2a),
stronger superordinate identification (Hypothe-
sis 2b), and stronger superordinate salience
(Hypothesis 2c) in the common fate condition
than in the no common fate condition.
For high-status group members, we propose
three possible responses to common fate. First,
it could be that common fate will result in a
psychological withdrawal from the group (de-
categorization), manifesting itself as lower lev-
els of identification (Hypothesis 3a) and sa-
lience (Hypothesis 3b) at both superordinate
and subgroup levels, and heightened levels of
individualization (Hypothesis 3c). Second, it
could be that high-status subgroup members
will show less intergroup competition for re-
sources when there is common fate than when
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there is none (out-group benevolence; Hypoth-
esis 4). Finally, it is possible that high-status
subgroup members will show more negative
evaluations of the out-group when there is com-
mon fate than when there is none (out-group
derogation; Hypothesis 5).
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty-eight maths-science and 45 social-sci-
ence undergraduate students from UQ partici-
pated in the study, for which they received
experimental credit. The number of participants
in each session ranged from 3 to 10. Participants
were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2
(subgroup status: high or low)  2 (common
fate: yes or no) between-subjects design.
Procedure
Participants were told that the purpose of the
study was to examine their opinions regarding
university life. It was explained to them that UQ
was divided into two faculty areas—maths sci-
ence and social science—and that some of the
questions would relate to how they felt about
each of these faculty areas.
Manipulation of Common Fate
In the no common fate condition, participants
were told that every year the government gives
a score to each faculty area (subgroup) based on
the overall performance of students and staff in
that faculty area. We told participants that sep-
arate scores were given to maths-science and
social-science faculty areas and that these
scores are used as a way of ranking faculty areas
throughout Australia. These rankings are then
published for the benefit of employees and pro-
spective students. It was explained that the
ranking is very important in terms of prestige
and material outcomes. Students had better job
opportunities if they graduated from a faculty
area with a high ranking, and the faculty area
could profit from a high ranking in terms of
funding. It was emphasized that the score for
one faculty does not affect the score for the
other faculty.
We told participants in the common fate con-
dition that the government gives a score to each
university based on the overall performance of
its students and staff. Separate scores are given
to maths-science and social-science faculties,
and the score for each is averaged to form a
single score for the university. The university
could profit from a high score in terms of pres-
tige, jobs, and funding, and these benefits would
spill over to the two faculty areas equally.
Manipulation of Status
Participants were given a table with the over-
all performance scores and the attached ranking
position for the previous year. Status of the
subgroup was manipulated by giving either a
high or a low performance score to each faculty
area. In the low-status condition, we used a
score of 52 points, which translated to a 25th
ranking on the list of all of the Australian fac-
ulty areas. In the high-status condition, we used
a score of 92 points, which translated to 2nd
position on the ranking list. In the common fate
condition, the average score for both faculty
areas was 72 points, which translated to a 13th
position on the ranking list for all Australian
universities. For half of the participants the so-
cial-science faculty area was attributed the
higher ranking, and for the other half the higher
ranking was attributed to the maths-science fac-
ulty area. Depending on the participants’ own
faculty area membership, participants were thus
allocated to high- and low-status conditions.
Questionnaire
The effectiveness of the status manipulation
was checked using two items. One item mea-
sured the performance of participants’ own
group (faculty area): “The overall performance
of my own group is . . .” (1  very poor, 7 
very good). The other item measured the per-
formance of the other group: “The overall per-
formance of the other group is . . .” (1  very
poor, 7 very good). By subtracting the second
item from the first item, a score was created that
indicated perceived relative status. The effec-
tiveness of the manipulation of common fate
was checked by asking the extent to which the
performance of the other faculty area had im-
plications for participants’ faculty area with re-
spect to (a) funding and (b) jobs (1  not at all,
7  very much; r  .75).
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Subgroup salience was measured with two
items adapted from Hornsey and Hogg (2000b,
2000c): “While you were reading the informa-
tion, how often were your thoughts drawn to
your faculty membership?” and “While you
were reading the information, to what extent do
you feel you were responding as a student of
your faculty area?” (1  not very often, 7 
very often; r  .65). The same items were then
rephrased and used to measure salience of the
superordinate (university) group (r  .55).
Identification was measured using two items
that were presented twice: once with respect to
faculty area membership and once with respect
to university membership. Participants rated
whether the group they belong to is an impor-
tant reflection of who they are and whether
belonging to their group is an important part of
their self-image (1  strongly disagree, 7 
strongly agree; r  .74 for faculty area and .86
for university). These items (adapted from Luh-
tanen & Crocker, 1992) were selected because
they tapped specifically into the extent to which
the identity is seen to be relevant or central to
the self-concept.
Intergroup evaluations were measured by as-
sessing participants’ attitudes toward their own
faculty area and toward the other faculty area on
three items: “How positive are you about your
faculty area/other faculty area?” (1  not at all,
7  very much), “How well do you think you
can get along with members of your faculty
area/other faculty area?” (1  not at all, 7 
very much), and “What is your overall impres-
sion of your faculty area/other faculty area?”
(1  not very favorable, 7  very favorable).
Two scales were constructed: one that measured
attitudes toward the other faculty area ( .75)
and one that measured attitudes toward partici-
pants’ own faculty area (  .78).
Two items measured intergroup competition.
Using 7-point scales (1  strongly disagree,
7  strongly agree), participants responded to
the statements “If UQ were in the position to
give the faculty areas extra money to do re-
search, my faculty area should try to get as
much of the money as possible” and “If UQ had
plans to improve the facilities for students, my
faculty area should work hard to get as much of
these facility improvements as possible” (r 
.87). Finally, two items measured individualiza-
tion: “I do not consider myself as belonging to
any group” and “I regard myself as a single
person rather than as a member of a certain
group of people” (1  strongly disagree, 7 
strongly agree; r  .54). Correlations among
the key measures—broken down separately for
each cell in the design—are presented in
Table 1.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Members of the high-status group rated the
performance of their own group to be superior
to the performance of the other group
(M  2.55, SD  1.39), whereas members of
the low-status group rated the performance of
their own group to be lower than the perfor-
mance of the other group (M  2.82,
SD  1.34), resulting in a significant difference
between the status conditions in line with the
manipulation, F(1, 99)  389.34, p  .01. The
analysis revealed no effect for common fate
either alone or in combination with status. The
manipulation of common fate also proved to be
successful. Participants in the common fate con-
dition considered the performance of the other
faculty area to have more implications for their
faculty area in terms of funding and jobs
(M  5.06, SD  1.41) than did participants in
the no common fate condition (M  4.41,
SD  1.50), F(1, 99)  4.81, p  .05. The
analysis revealed no effects of status. Finally,
no differences were found between the maths-
science and social-science faculty area with re-
spect to the manipulation checks of status and
common fate.
Intergroup Evaluations
Intergroup evaluations were analyzed using
a 2 (common fate: yes or no)  2 (subgroup
status: high or low)  2 (in-group vs. out-
group) mixed-design analysis of variance with
repeated measures on the last variable. Overall,
participants were more positive toward their
own group (M  5.31, SD  0.98) than toward
the out-group (M  5.00, SD  0.92), F(1,
99)  6.59, p  .05. However, this main effect
was qualified by an interaction with status, F(1,
99)  32.67, p  .01. Participants were more
positive toward their own group when it was
high status (M  5.76, SD  0.72) than when it
was low status (M  4.87, SD  1.01), F(1,
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99)  26.81, p  .01. In contrast, participants
were more negative toward the out-group when
their in-group was high status (M  4.75,
SD  0.91) than when it was low status
(M  5.24, SD  0.86), F(1, 99)  7.28, p 
.01. When examining the difference scores (in-
group minus out-group), it became clear that
participants in the high-status condition dis-
played in-group bias (M  1.01, SD  1.08)
whereas those in the low-status group displayed
out-group bias (M  0.37, SD  1.32), a
result that is consistent with Hypothesis 1a.
However, inconsistent with Hypotheses 2a
and 5, there were no effects of common fate on
intergroup evaluations, either alone or in com-
bination with status.
Identification
With respect to superordinate identification,
only a main effect of common fate on the iden-
tification scale was found, F(1, 99)  4.82, p 
.05. Participants rated the UQ identity to be less
important to the self-concept when there was
common fate (M 3.51, SD 1.88) than when
there was no common fate (M  4.24,
SD  1.31). The fact that this effect emerged
for both high- and low-status participants sug-
gests support for Hypothesis 3a but is inconsis-
tent with Hypothesis 2b. In relation to the sub-
group (i.e., faculty area) identity, only a main
effect of status was found on identification, F(1,
99)  5.47, p  .05. Consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1b, high-status group members reported
stronger identification (M  3.86, SD  1.50)
than did members of the low-status group
(M  3.15, SD  1.39).
Salience
On ratings of university salience, only an
interaction between status and common fate was
found, F(1, 99)  4.03, p  .05 (see Figure 1).
Tests of simple main effects showed that, con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2c, members of the low-
status group rated the university to be more
salient when there was common fate (M 5.09,
SD  1.40) than when there was no common
fate (M  4.38, SD  1.32), F(1, 99)  4.56,
p  .05. However, for members of the high-
Table 1
Intercorrelations Among Measures Within Each Condition
Measure Faculty identification Faculty salience Individualization Intergroup competition
High status
Common fate (n  22)
Intergroup bias .42† .33 .54** .07
Faculty identification .19 .58** .04
Faculty salience .16 .01
Individualization .34
No common fate (n  29)
Intergroup bias .45* .33† .37* .01
Faculty identification .13 .29 .20
Faculty salience .04 .28
Individualization .08
Low status
Common fate (n  27)
Intergroup bias .15 .17 .40* .02
Faculty identification .29 .28 .11
Faculty salience .08 .13
Individualization .35†
No common fate (n  25)
Intergroup bias .07 .25 .40* .43*
Faculty identification .06 .11 .05
Faculty salience .09 .14
Individualization .31
† p  .10 (marginally significant). * p  .05. ** p  .01.
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status group, university salience did not differ
as a function of whether there was common fate
(M  4.70, SD  1.00) or not (M  4.95,
SD  1.03), F(1, 99)  1, ns. Furthermore,
there were no differences between the high- and
low-status groups in either the common fate
condition, F(1, 99)  1.26, ns, or the no com-
mon fate condition, F(1, 99)  3.00, ns.
On ratings of faculty area (i.e., subgroup)
salience, a main effect of common fate
emerged, F(1, 99)  5.06, p  .05. Overall,
participants in the no common fate condition
rated the faculty area to be more salient
(M  5.20, SD  1.17) than did those in the
common fate condition (M  4.69, SD  1.42).
However, this main effect was qualified by an
interaction with status, F(1, 99)  19.13, p 
.01 (see Figure 2). Consistent with Hypothe-
sis 3b, for members of the high-status group the
subgroup was more salient when there was no
common fate (M 5.64, SD 0.72) than when
there was common fate (M  4.07, SD  1.30),
F(1, 99)  21.53, p  .01. However, for mem-
bers of the low-status group, subgroup salience
did not differ as a function of whether there was
common fate (M  5.20, SD  1.32) or not
(M  4.70, SD  1.38), F(1, 99)  2.30, ns.
Furthermore, when there was no common fate,
the subgroup was more salient for high-status
participants than for low-status participants,
F(1, 99)  8.25, p  .01. When there was
common fate, however, the reverse was true,
such that the subgroup was more salient for
low-status participants than for high-status par-
ticipants, F(1, 99)  10.92, p  .01.
Individualization
Only an interaction between status and com-
mon fate was found on individualization, F(1,
99)  8.04, p  .01 (see Figure 3). Tests of
simple main effects showed that members of the
high-status group displayed significantly higher
levels of individualization when there was com-
mon fate (M  5.36, SD  1.31) than when
there was no common fate (M  4.36,
SD  1.46), F(1, 99)  6.47, p  .05. This is
consistent with Hypothesis 3c. For members of
the low-status group, however, levels of indi-
vidualization did not differ as a function of
whether there was common fate (M  4.54,
SD  1.51) or not (M  5.10, SD  1.25), F(1,
99)  2.12, ns. Furthermore, when there was
common fate, members of the high-status group
displayed more individualization than did mem-
bers of the low-status group, F(1, 99)  4.27,
p  .05. When there was no common fate,
Figure 1. The effect of status and common fate on uni-
versity salience.
Figure 2. The effect of status and common fate on faculty
salience.
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however, there was a marginal tendency for the
reverse effect to emerge: Low-status partici-
pants individualized more than did high-status
participants, F(1, 99)  3.77, p  .055.
Intergroup Competition
A main effect of status was found on inter-
group competition, F(1, 99)  29.38, p  .01.
Participants in the low-status condition
(M  5.08, SD  1.19) were more willing to
engage in intergroup competition than were par-
ticipants in the high-status condition (M 3.83,
SD  1.39). However, the main effect of status
on intergroup competition was qualified by an
interaction with common fate, F(1, 99) 11.43,
p .01 (see Figure 4). Consistent with Hypoth-
esis 4, high-status group members were more
willing to be involved in intergroup competition
when there was no common fate (M  4.34,
SD  1.00) than when there was common fate
(M  3.16, SD  1.55), F(1, 99)  11.71, p 
.01. In contrast, for members of the low-status
group, intergroup competition did not differ as a
function of whether there was common fate
(M  5.30, SD  1.09) or not (M  4.84,
SD  1.27), F(1, 99)  1.80, ns. Furthermore,
when there was common fate, members of the
low-status group were more willing to be in-
volved in intergroup competition than were
members of the high-status group, F(1,
99)  38.86, p  .01. In contrast, when there
was no common fate, no difference was found
between high- and low-status groups on this
measure, F(1, 99)  2.19, ns.
Summary
To summarize, low-status group members re-
ported the superordinate group to be more sa-
lient when there was common fate compared
with when there was none. However, they also
reported weaker identification with the superor-
dinate group under conditions of common fate.
The common fate manipulation did not affect
ratings of salience or identification with regard
to the low-status participants’ faculty area (the
subgroup); neither did it affect low-status par-
ticipants’ ratings on intergroup evaluations, in-
dividualization, or intergroup competition.
Like low-status participants, the high-status
participants also reported lower superordinate
identification when there was common fate
compared with when there was no common
fate. In contrast to the low-status participants,
however, high-status participants reported
lower subgroup salience, higher levels of indi-
vidualization, and less intergroup competition
when there was common fate than when there
Figure 3. The effect of status and common fate on
individualization.
Figure 4. The effect of status and common fate on inter-
group competition.
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was no common fate. The common fate manip-
ulation did not affect the high-status partici-
pants’ ratings of intergroup evaluations, sub-
group identification, or superordinate salience.
Mediational Analyses
There are two possible explanations for the
observed effect of common fate on high-status
participants’ intergroup competition ratings.
One explanation is that under conditions of
common fate, the high-status group is motivated
to demonstrate benevolence toward the weaker
out-group. An alternative explanation, however,
is that the low amounts of intergroup competi-
tion displayed by the high-status group mem-
bers in the common fate condition are a mani-
festation of the fact that these participants were
not operating at an intergroup level. Earlier, we
stated that high-status group members reported
relatively low levels of subgroup salience and
high levels of individualization under condi-
tions of common fate. It is possible, then, that
the relatively low levels of intergroup competi-
tion are a result of this shift from group-based to
individual-based self-definition. To test whether
this is the case, we performed a 2  2 analysis
of covariance on intergroup competition, with
subgroup salience and individualization entered
as covariates. The interaction effect remained
highly significant, F(1, 97)  9.36, p  .01,
suggesting that the effects on intergroup
competition cannot be explained as a result
of decategorization per se. Instead, it appears
that decategorization and out-group benevo-
lence are independent (though complementary)
strategies.
Discussion
One striking aspect of the results is that the
induction of common fate did not succeed in
raising the salience of, or the identification with,
the superordinate identity. Indeed, there was
some evidence for the opposite process. Under
conditions of common fate, participants re-
ported less identification with the superordinate
group than when there was no common fate.
Furthermore, the invocation of common fate did
not affect inter-subgroup evaluations. Overall,
on measures of positivity toward the subgroups,
there was a general tendency for high-status
people to show in-group bias and for low-status
people to show out-group bias, but the manip-
ulation of common fate had no effect on these
ratings. Thus, as predicted, there was no evi-
dence in the current study that common fate
was effective in building a sense of superordi-
nate identification and improving intergroup
relations.
The key difference between our study and
previous research that has demonstrated the
positive effects of common fate is that we used
subgroups that differed in status, whereas pre-
vious research has used groups that were
matched on status or for whom status differ-
ences were not salient (e.g., Castano, 2002;
Dovidio et al., 1998; Kramer & Brewer, 1984).
We argue that status is a crucial moderator of
the effects of common fate. For high-status
members, we expected that common fate would
be viewed negatively because they are being
afforded disproportionately low levels of re-
ward relative to what they deserve. In short,
they are being “dragged down” by the lower
status group. We expected that high-status
group members would respond to this by (a)
showing heightened out-group derogation on
attitudinal measures, (b) showing lower levels
of intergroup competition with respect to re-
sources (out-group benevolence), and/or (c) de-
categorizing. Overall, there was solid evidence
for two of these strategies: decategorization and
out-group benevolence.
Under conditions of common fate, high-sta-
tus group members (but not low-status group
members) reported lower levels of subgroup
salience and an increase in individualization
compared with when there was no common
fate. We argue that this shift from group-based
self-definition to individualized self-definition
under conditions of common fate is a conse-
quence of the fact that high-status subgroup
members no longer perceive there to be direct
rewards for their group’s efforts. For this rea-
son, group-based effort becomes less attractive,
and people retreat to an identity for which they
see a more direct and controllable relationship
between effort and reward: the individual iden-
tity. Decategorization is an attractive solution to
the dissatisfaction aroused by common fate be-
cause it is not inhibited by reality constraints
and does not require a fundamental shift in the
relationship between the groups; instead, it
merely requires a psychological shift in the
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level of inclusiveness at which people
self-define.
It should be noted, though, that on some
measures there was limited evidence of decat-
egorization. Specifically, on subgroup identifi-
cation and superordinate salience, the mean rat-
ings of high-status participants were in the pre-
dicted direction, but the differences between the
means were not significant. It should also be
noted that overall, the levels of group identifi-
cation reported here (operationalized as the cen-
trality of the identity to the self-concept) lay
beneath the midpoint of the scale, suggesting
only moderate levels of identification. Given
that these groups do not appear to be of strong
relevance to the self-concept, it is perhaps un-
surprising that decategorization should be such
an attractive option for participants. It is possi-
ble that if the group was more central to the
self-concept, then high-status group members
would not decategorize in response to common
fate but would instead pursue more group-based
strategies.
Even in the context of the moderate levels of
identification reported in the current study, the
results on the intergroup competition measure
suggest that high-status group members have
not given up altogether on a group-based solu-
tion to the problems posed by common fate.
High-status group members were less keen to
engage in competition with the out-group for
resources when there was common fate than
when each group could determine its own fate.
The implication of this effect is that high-status
subgroup members are trying to lend a helping
hand to the weaker out-group. By extending
benevolence in terms of funding and facilities, it
could be that the high-status subgroup is trying
to improve the performance of the weaker sub-
group, presumably with the ultimate aim of
improving the university’s overall ranking.
Whereas decategorization is an easy way of
psychologically minimizing the discomfort im-
plied by common fate, intergroup benevolence
is a more ambitious, group-based strategy de-
signed to improve performance in the long term.
Interestingly, the effect of common fate on
competition was not mediated by indices of
decategorization, suggesting that benevolence
and decategorization are independent strategies
that coexist within the minds of high-status
group members.
We anticipated that although high-status
group members might be prepared to show
some benevolence to the weaker out-group in
terms of resources, the invocation of common
fate would provoke resentful attitudes toward,
and negative evaluations of, the out-group.
There was no evidence for this, however. One
reasonable explanation for this is that high-
status group members opted for individualiza-
tion as a way of psychologically escaping the
dissatisfaction associated with common fate,
and so group-based derogation was not a salient
(or constructive) option for them. A second
possible explanation is that our participants saw
the relative performance of the faculty areas to
be a function of organizational priorities, man-
agement decision making, and/or resource allo-
cations. This might lead participants to feel the
status division is (a) largely out of the hands of
rank-and-file members and (b) not necessarily a
reflection of the group’s lack of effort or ability.
If, however, people felt as though their group
was being dragged down by a lack of effort or
ability on behalf of a lower status out-group,
then it would be understandable if this led to
increased resentment and negativity toward the
out-group. Attributing performance to external
factors might also help explain the fact that
low-status group members did not demonstrate
increased out-group liking in the common fate
condition. If group members could reasonably
attribute the status position of the groups to
something internal, such as effort or ability,
then perhaps low-status group members would
feel more positively toward the better perform-
ing out-group under conditions of common fate.
The potential role of attributions in moderating
the effects of status and common fate would be
an interesting avenue for future research.
As discussed above, the invocation of com-
mon fate did not make low-status group mem-
bers feel more positively toward the higher sta-
tus out-group. But did it succeed in building a
sense of common identity at the superordinate
level? Here, the evidence is mixed. As pre-
dicted, low-status participants reported the su-
perordinate identity to be more salient when
there was common fate than when there was
not. However, contrary to predictions, low-sta-
tus participants (like high-status participants)
reported weaker identification with their super-
ordinate category when there was common fate
than when there was not. At this point we
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should emphasize that salience was operation-
alized as the extent to which the category was
cognitively accessible in the situation. Just be-
cause a category is cognitively accessible (or
readily brought to mind) does not necessarily
imply that the category will be internalized as
an important part of the self-concept. It could be
that low-status group members in the common
fate condition became very conscious of the
impact their poor performance was having on
the common good (manifesting itself as high
levels of superordinate salience) but at the same
time felt a degree of discomfort or shame about
this knowledge (manifesting itself as low levels
of superordinate identification). Whatever pro-
cesses are in operation here, the overall picture
with regard to how common fate affects low-
status group members is less positive than we
had anticipated. The hypotheses for this study
were built around the premise that the invoca-
tion of common fate would have negative psy-
chological consequences for high-status group
members but positive psychological conse-
quences for low-status group members. How-
ever the expected payoff for low-status group
members is not in evidence.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In summary, there is no evidence that com-
mon fate has overtly destructive consequences
for groups that differ in status, at least in terms
of hostile intergroup attitudes. There is evi-
dence, however, that the invocation of common
fate results in high-status group members de-
taching from their group identities, which is not
always a desirable outcome. Furthermore, there
is a conspicuous lack of evidence that common
fate improved intergroup relations or promoted
a shared, superordinate identity. What conclu-
sions and recommendations can be drawn from
this?
Work on social loafing has highlighted the
need for individuals to feel that they get a direct
reward for their contribution to group effort (see
Karau & Williams, 1993, for a review). We
would lean toward a similar recommendation at
the subgroup level. Sharing rewards equally
among subgroups (common fate) might help
create a sense of superordinate identity only if
each subgroup is performing at a relatively
equal level. If, however, there are vivid differ-
ences in performance, the potential exists for
dissatisfaction or detachment on behalf of the
better performing subgroup. A response to this
might be to create provisions for subgroups to
get differential rewards depending on their sub-
group performance. This does not necessarily
imply that rewards are not shared at all; indeed,
in many contexts, some degree of interdepen-
dence and common fate among subgroups is
inevitable. However, within these reality con-
straints, it might be possible to allow for better
performing subgroups to receive a degree of
acknowledgement or recognition for their supe-
rior efforts, whether that be in terms of prestige
or material rewards. Even if the difference in
rewards is small, it might be the type of sym-
bolic act that allows high-status subgroups to
remain invested in their group identities and to
feel as though group-based effort is worthwhile.
The notion of differential rewards also comple-
ments recent literature that emphasizes the iden-
tity benefits that ensue when subgroup differ-
ences are acknowledged within a superordinate
category (Eggins et al., 2002; Hornsey & Hogg,
2000c, 2002; Van Leeuwen et al., 2003).
The notion of differential reward has obvious
benefits for high-status subgroup members, but
the benefits for low-status subgroup members
are less clear. Is it possible to devise a strategy
that has positive consequences for members of
both groups? One possibility is that the status
differences between the groups are acknowl-
edged at the outset, as soon as the group’s goals
are linked. For members of the high-status
group, this strategy implies a secure high sub-
group status, which might enhance their moti-
vation to help the other group learn from their
expertise and abilities. In this way, they know
that their high status is recognized, and they can
strengthen this position in the future by under-
taking a helping, expert role. For the low-status
group, it is clear from the beginning that their
initial status position is not ideal, but they have
a chance to upgrade this status by learning from
the expertise of the high-status group.
Of course, such a process could be helped
considerably if subgroups could be differenti-
ated on more than one status dimension. For
example Brown and Wade (1987; see also De-
schamps & Brown, 1983) demonstrated that
intergroup relations are optimal when sub-
groups feel as though they can specialize in
areas of expertise that are separate but comple-
mentary. In this way, the initial status differ-
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ences between the groups should be seen as
additive rather than subtractive in terms of the
group’s overall performance. Alternatively, one
subgroup might be seen to be performing in a
superior way on performance-related dimen-
sions, but the other group could be seen to be
contributing on a more social dimension. By
stressing the differences on two separate dimen-
sions, subgroups can benefit from each other
without losing their distinctiveness (see also
Dovidio et al., 1998).
It should be noted, however, that the recom-
mendations made above are predicated on the
notion that the status differences between the
groups are legitimate. If there is a perception
that the status differentials were built on an
illegitimate basis, then acknowledging the “su-
perior” performance of the high-status group or
asking the low-status group to learn from the
expertise of the high-status group may simply
lead to a more acute awareness of the injustice
of the status differential. In turn, this might lead
to increased in-group bias among low-status
members (see Ellemers et al., 1993; Hornsey,
Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003; Jost & Major,
2001, for discussions of how perceptions of
legitimacy affect intergroup relations among
groups with low power or status).
In summary, the current study demonstrates
one boundary condition to the notion that com-
mon fate can promote intergroup harmony. We
would argue that such a strategy is less likely to
be effective when there are salient status differ-
ences between the subgroups. This is not a
trivial boundary condition, because it is rela-
tively rare that subgroups are perfectly matched
in terms of status. We argue, however, that the
invocation of common fate might still be bene-
ficial if (a) there is some provision for differen-
tial reward to be allocated to the subgroups, (b)
the status differences are openly acknowledged
at the outset, or (c) the subgroups are shown to
have separate but complementary areas of ex-
pertise. By systematically examining these
questions, a deeper insight can be achieved with
regard to the psychological consequences of
common fate among real-world groups.
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